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C01.'IT·1UNICATI01if FROM THE COl'llHSSION TO THE COUNCIL 
CONCERNDfG PROPOSED FOOD AID IN CEREALS TO THE 
REPUBLIC OF DID IA 
1. TifllRODUCTION 
The purpose of this document is to draw the attention of the 
Council to an urgent request for food aid in cereals attached to this 
document received 'from the Republic of India. 
The Commission wishes to emphasize the urgency of this request, 
since the period of shortage is already beginning. 
2. FOOD SITUATION 
Production of all cereals in India for 1973/74 is now expected 
(according to FAO) to reach 105-106 million tonnes, compared with the 
1970/71 peak level of 108.4 million. tonnes and in the face of the large 
population increase since that year. 
Assuming the level of requirements per capita to be comparable 
to level of availabilities during the last t\iO years for l-Thich full 
data are available (i.e. 535 gm per head per day), then the total needs 
for 1973/74 can be assessed at approximately 115 million tonnes, which 
was in fact the official production target for the year. 
An overall deficit therefore of as much as 9-10 million tonnes 
can be envisaged. (This is compatible with information communicated by 
the TI1C, that imports required to cover the shortfall could amount to 
8-10 million tonnes). 
3. To fill part of this gap the .Indian government proposes to 
make commercial imports during 1974 to the extent of three million tonnes, 
in addition to the t\vO million tonnes of \'1heat loaned by the USSR and 
already delivered. No arrangements have been made for imports on non-
commercial terms apart from a grant of 30,000 tonnes from the United 
Kingdom. 
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There remains therefore a deficit of severe;,l million tonnes this 
year, which India will have great difficulties in filling. The"most 
urgent need "1-Till be for supplies durinz the period July to October 1974 
before arrival of the monsoon cron, in order to support the public 
distribution system of retail sales in urban areas. 
4 .. ECONOMIC AND FINAUCIAL SITUATION" 
India is in fact one of the countries most affected by the current 
world economic situation. One example of the country's present difficulties 
is the increase in the cost of petroleum i~ports from ~ 500 million in 
1973 to ~ 1,500 million in 1974• India's general economic position and 
the heavy demand on her foreign exchange resources mean that forther 
commercial imports on a large scale are likely to place intolerable 
strains upon the economy. 
5 • ACTION" PROPOSED 
In view of the above, and of the quantities available to the 
Community at this time, the Commission proposes the immediate grant 
to India of 30,000 tonnes of cereals, drawn from the reserve of 
54,500 tonnes established by the Council under the 1973/74 scheme. 
It is proposed that delivery should be on the normal fob terms 
adopted by the Community for the 1973/74 cereals program. HOiiever, in 
view of the urgency with which the quantities are required, authority 
is requested to commence arrangements for delivery as soon as negotiations 
on the text of the supply agreement have been completed between the 
Commission and the Government of India. 
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Note Verbale 
I 5. V!. 1974 
Indian Mission to the European Economic Community 
presents its compliments to the Directorate General of 
Development and Cooperation of the Commission of the EEC 
and has the honour to bring the following for their 
favourable consideration. 
2. The Community is well a.......mre of the food situation 
in India. Hov1ever, a fe\·T facts bear recalling. Production 
· of foodgrains in India, ~hich had reached a peak figure 
of 108.4 mj.llion tonnes in 1970-71 (July-June), declined 
to 105e2 million tonnes in 1971-72 and to 95.2 million 
tonnes in 1972-73. To provide food at reasonable prices 
for vulnerable sections of the population and to give 
relief to drought-affected areas, the public distribution 
(i.e. retail sales) system had to be enlarged and widened. • .. 
The quantity made available through this system increased 
from ?.8 million tonnes in 1971 to 10.5 million tonnes in 
1972 and further to 11.4 million tonnes in 1973. This was 
made possible by supplies obtained through internal 
procurement, runnina; down of Government stocks and some 
commercial imports. Thus, during the year 1973, Government 
stocks of foodgrains were drawn down by 0.7 million tonnes 
and imports amounted to 3.6 million tonnes. In spite of 
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these me~sures, per capita availability of foodgrains 
during 1973 1·ras substantially lmver than in 1971 and 1972, 
resulting in increased pressure on the prices of foodgrains 
' 
and consequential har~ship for lmv-income groups of the 
country's population. 
3. Total production of foodgrains in 1973-74 is 
currently estimated by the FAO at about 105-106 million 
tonnes. While this estimate of foodgrains production is 
better than in the previous year, it has not been 
commensurate with the increase in population which has 
risen by more than 30 million since 1971. The imbalance 
bet\veen supply and demand is therefore expected to continue 
through 1974. T~3 gap between production and consumption 
is estimated to run into several millions of tonnes. 
4-. The existence of this gap has reflected in the 
persisting trend of rising prices. Market arrivals of 
foodgrains have been lo-vrer than desired, partly because 
of the consequences of two drought years in succession. 
In a democratic system like India's, procurement of grains 
by Government agencies and private trade depends on the 
voluntary sale by millions of farmers. At the same time, 
the Government is expected t~ carry adequate stocks to 
provision the public distribution (i.e. retail sales) system 
with a view to meeting the needs of deficit areas and 
vulnerable sections of population and to influence the 
market situation in the directio~ .. of ·s_tabilisa tion of 
foodgrains prices. The strain on the public distribution 
(i.e. retail sales) system is particularly heavy in the 
lean ~on~~s;?f ~~:October before the arrival of the new J\ f 
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crop in November-December \vhich accounts for nearly 
two-thirds of annual harvest in India. 
5. .A substantj_al gap is therefore foreseen between the 
quanttties likely to be needed for the public distribution 
(i,e$ retail sales) system and those that can be procured 
domestically~ The gap is proposed to be bridged by 
importing more than three million tonnes of foodgrains 
from abroad during the year 1974. Of this, a quantity of 
1 .. 3 million tonnes of foodgrains was imported into the 
country durtng the first quarter of 1974. 
6., For some years past, the Government of India have been 
mal{ing every effort to bridge the gap in the requirement, 
caused by the unfavourable course of the season, by effecting 
commercial i.rnports.. This is the reason why no request 
has been addressed in the recent past to the Co:nmunity, 
in the context of its membership of the Food Aid Convention. 
Unfortuna tE-:ly, a combination of factors is making this 
course increasingly impracticable: this includes (a) running 
down of domestic foodgrain reserves because of continuous 
droughtf (b) heavy demand on foreign exchange reserves 
because of the increase in import prices of many essential 
ito me·· 
,,.. .-;) ' and (c) the increase in 'vorld price of foodgrains. 
As the Community is a\va.re, India 1 s foreign exchange 
situation has been subjected to an exceptional strain 
because of the extraordinary increase in the prices·of its 
normal imports and a very marginal increase in the prices 
of j_ts export products. For instance, petroleum imports 
which cost about $ 500 million in 1973 are likely to cost 
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$ 1.5 billion in 1974. Similarly, the import bill of 
fertilizer·s which was $ 225 million in 1973 may rise to 
more than double this amount. If the volume of imports of 
these essential items is curtailed, the consequential gap 
in the availability of foodgrains will be higher. It is 
in these circumstances that the Government of India 
feels obliged to explore possibilities of non-commercial 
imports of foodgrains from abroad. 
8. In view of the foregoing, the Indian Mission to the 
EEC requests the Commission of the EEC to give urgent 
and favourable consideration to the allotment to India 
of a sizeable quantity of foodgrains under the Community's 
Food Aid Programme for developing countries. The Indian 
1~ssion is aware of the Community's procedures in this 
regard and is conscious of their inherent limitations 
for meeting reauests for urgent shipments. Nevertheless, 
the Mission trusts that having regard to India's 
self-restraint in the past and the needs likely to arise 
during the course of the coming summer months, the Commission 
will find it possible to take appropriate action to reinforce 
the Indian capability to meet the anticipated requirements 
of its public distribution (i.e. retail sales) system. 
9. The. Indian Hission to the EEC avails itself of this 
opportunity to renevt to the Directorate General of 
Development and Cooperation of the Commission of the EEC 
Bruxelles, 
May 31' 1974. 
Directorate General of Development 
and Cooperation, 
Commission of the EEC, 
Bruxelles. 
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